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PRESUMPTIONS-THE UNIFORM RULES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
L EGAL commentators have long recognized that basic reform is
needed in several areas of evidence law and that greater uniformity
in the rules of evidence among jurisdictions would promote a
sounder administration of justice. Professor Thayer laid the keystone
to evidence reform when he urged that "rules of evidence should be
simplified; and should take on the general character of principles,
to guide the sound judgment of the judge."' In 1942 the American
Law Institute, concerning itself with the admissibility rather than
the weight to be ascribed to evidence, adopted the Model Code of
Evidence, in an attempt to reform and codify evidence law.2 Al-
though many commentators applauded this massive effort, the Model
Code received little acceptance as a practical vehicle for evidence
reform. Criticism was leveled primarily at the academic language
employed, the great discretion given the trial judge, and the liberality
of certain portions of the Model Code.3
Not until adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws was there a substantial movement for evidence reform outside
academic circles. 4 The drafters of the Uniform Rules used the Model
Code as a basic starting point and attempted to achieve acceptability
and uniformity. To accomplish these goals, the Commissioners
modified some of the more liberal sections of the Model Code and at-
tempted to phrase the provisions of the Uniform Rules in language
familiar to judges and practicing attorneys. However, the Uniform
2 THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 530 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as THAYER]. Thayer added that the two leading principles should
be: "(1) that nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of some matter
requiring to be proved; and (2) that everything which is thus probative should come
in, unless a clear ground of policy or law excludes it." Ibid.
2 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). Rule 9 was the key rule of the Model Code and
made all evidence admissible except that which was explicitly excluded for policy
reasons. See note 1 supra. Rule 105 gave the trial judge extensive discretion to con-
trol the admissibility of evidence and the conduct of the trial.
ISee generally Gard, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 19, 23-24
(1956).
'See notes 7, 8 & 9 infra and accompanying text.
9 Gard, supra note 3, at 23; see UNIFORM RuL.Es OF EVIDENCE, Prefactory Note
161-63.
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Rules retained the Model Code philosophy that all relevant and
material evidence should be admitted unless there is a specific rule
excluding it.8
The Uniform Rules have created a definite, albeit a slow, move-
ment on the part of an increasing number of courts, legislatures and
bar associations to consider the adoption of uniform codes of evi-
dence. In fact, the Uniform Rules have been completely adopted in
three jurisdictions,7 partially adopted in another8 and are under
serious study elsewhere.9 An important aspect of this movement
has seen the United States Supreme Court take preliminary steps
toward the promulgation of a uniform code of evidence, similar to
the Uniform Rules, for use in the federal district courts.'0 In light
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, (a) every person is qualified to be a
witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness, and (c) no person
is disqualified to testify to any matter, and (d) no person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose any matter or to produce any object or writing, and (e) no person has a
privilege that another shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall
not produce any object or writing, and () all relevant evidence is admissable." UN!-
FORM RULz OF EvIDENCE 7. As the comment to rule 7 states: "This rule is essential
to the general policy and plan of this work. It wipes the slate clean of all disqualifi-
cations of witness, privileges and limitations on the admissibility of relevant evidence.
Then harmony and uniformity are achieved by writing back onto the slate the limi-
tations and exceptions desired." The Uniform Rules also provide that the trial judge
shall have the discretion to exclude evidence which he feels will consume too much
time, lead to prejudice, confuse the issues, or surprise a party. UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 45.
'The Uniform Rules have been adopted almost verbatim by: Kansas, KAN. CODE OF
Crv. P. §§ 60-401 to -470 (1963); the Panama Canal Zone, 5 C.Z.C. §§ 2731-2996 (1963);
and the Virgin Islands, 5 V.I.C. §§ 771-956 (1957).
8 New Jersey has adopted most of the Uniform Rules dealing with privileges. N.J.
Stat. 2A: 84A-17-32 (1960).
New Jersey is considering the Uniform Rules, except those dealing with privileges,
see note 8 supra, and adoption of the entire Uniform Rules with some modification is
forseeable. REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT CoMMIrrEE ON EVIDENCE (1963).
California, Oklahoma and Washington are among others giving the Uniform Rules
study. The Uniform Rules were proposed for adoption in Utah, Preliminary Draft of
the Rules of Evidence, 27 UTAH B. BULL. 5 (1957), but have met with opposition
among members of the Utah Supreme Court, and their present status is uncertain.
Letter from Honorable Dean Sheffield, Secretary of Utah State Bar, March 12, 1964. For
general discussions of the Uniform Rules, see, e.g., Symposium-Minnesota and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 40 MINN. L. REv. 297 (1956); How the Adoption of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence Would Affect the Law of Evidence in Oregon, 41 ORE. L.
REV. 273 (1962). A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTcGRS L. REV.
479 (1956); The "Uniform Rules" and the California Law of Evidence-A Symposium,
2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1954).
10 See COMMITrEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISIBILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF
DEVELOPING UNIFORM RuES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIar COURTS (1962)
(Reported in 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962)) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAl.
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of the latter development this comment will undertake first to pro-
vide a general survey of the present status of federal evidence law,
and then to analyze and explain the problems facing adoption for
use in the federal courts of standardized rules dealing with pre-
sumptions.
FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW
The status of federal evidence law is considered unsatisfactory
by many observers."1 This condition can in part be attributed to the
Conformity Act under which the federal courts were to "conform,
as near as may be," to state procedure, 1 2 and to the Rules of Decision
Act whereby state decisions are to be followed unless the Consti-
tution or some federal statute provides otherwise.' 3 These acts have
had the effect of making federal practice and procedure, and de-
cisional law conform to the law of the state in which the federal
court sits.' 4 The Enabling Act of 1934,15 which purports to give
EVIDENCE RuLEs]. The Report suggests that the Uniform Rules might be a model for such
rules, id. at 43-48. Several Judicial Conferences of the Circuit Courts and the Ameri-
can Bar Association have urged adoption of uniform rules of evidence for the federal
courts. Id. at 1-2. For general articles discussing the adoption of a federal code of evi-
dence see, e.g., Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv.
275 (1962); Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 24
F.R.D. 381 (1960); Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D.
429 (1958); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692
(1963); see also 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.02 (2d ed. 1951).
"I See, e.g., Degnan, supra note 10, at 275-76; Joiner, supra note 10, at 436.
12 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 197. See generally 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAmrcE. 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MOORE). The Con-
formity Act was in effect nullified by adoption of the Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1958); note 15 infra.
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress 9therwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). See generally 5 MOORE 43.02[2]. It seems self evi-
dent that if there were a uniform code of evidence for federal courts, the Rules of
Decision Act would no longer be applicable.
1See Degnan, supra note 10, at 278; Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof,
58 HARv. L. Rv. 153, 171-72 (1944).
1"The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of
the district courts of the United States in civil actions.
"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
Professor Wigmore has argued that the courts inherently have all the rule-making
powers. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitu-
tionally, 23 ILL. L. Rav. 276 (1928). However, it seems that the enabling act adds
to the Court's inherent power and makes the adoption of evidence rules for the
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the Supreme Court power to adopt rules of "practice and procedure"
for the federal courts, in effect allowed for a change in the standard
from "conformity" to state law to "uniformity" within the federal
court system. Pursuant to this rule-making power, the Court
fashioned the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The principal federal rule dealing with evidence is rule 43 (a)
which provides for the admissibility in the federal district courts
of evidence which would be admitted under the laws of the United
States, the rules of evidence in the federal equity courts, or the
rules of evidence of the state where the court is sitting.a6 This rule
is concerned entirely with the admissibility of evidence and was
viewed by the drafters of the federal rules as a mere stopgap measure
until a comprehensive code of evidence could be adopted.'7 How-
ever, the first steps toward adoption of a code of evidence were not
undertaken until the current study, and, as a result, judges and
practitioners are presently forced to familiarize themselves with the
three systems of evidence enunciated in rule 43 (a). 8 The situation
is further complicated by rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which admits evidence according to the federal common
law.' 9
district courts more feasible. See Joiner, supra note 10, at 433-35. For a general study
of the rule-making power in the various states, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADAIsNISTRA-
TION, RULE MAKING POWER OF THE COURTS 17-20 (Supp. 1958).
"See generally 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 961-64,
967, 970 (Wright ed. 1961); 5 MooRE 43.02[2] 9: [4], 43.03; Note, The Admissibility of
Evidence Under Federal Rule 43(a), 48 VA. L. REv. 939 (1962). It is generally ac-
knowledged that rule 43 (a) applies to both diversity and non-diversity cases. See
Ladd, supra note 10, at 696.
" See 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 961, at 207; PRELININARY
REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES 51. The drafters of the federal rules gave some
consideration to attacking evidence problems, but decided that such a major under-
taking would delay the proposed federal rules and might jeopardize the entire
project. See Clark, Foreward, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10
RUTGERS L. REv. 479, 481-82 (1956).
18 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
11 FED. R. Cuiu. P. 26 provides in part that "the admissibility of evidence and the
competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." Rule 26 was adopted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(1958).
Thus, in effect, the judges and trial attorneys must be familiar with four systems
of evidence. "Such overlapping, and at times, conflicting rules, makes trials confused,
slows them up, creates ground for argument on appeal, adds to the expense of the
trial, and does not promote the rapid dispatch of justice." Joiner, Federal Uniform
Evidence Rules, 32 REF. J. 103 (1958).
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The power of the Supreme Court to promote and adopt evidenti-
ary rules for the federal district courts is subject to little or no doubt.
The enabling act confers power to prescribe rules of "practice and
procedure" and most evidence rules are included in this power.2 0
The only significant limitation on this rule-making power is that
rules adopted pursuant to it "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right."' 21 The parol evidence rule and conclusive
presumptions are generally classified as "substantive" and thus be-
yond the rule-making power.2 2 While it has been argued that
"burden of proof" and privileges may be beyond the rule-making
power, it is well established that the vast majority of evidence law
can be reformed and codified by the Supreme Court for use in the
federal district courts.
The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins23 presents significant
problems in promoting uniformity of evidence law in the federal
courts. That case reinforced the "conformity" to state law approach
by requiring federal courts in diversity cases to follow the "sub-
stantive" law of the forum state.24 Thus, even though an evidentiary
rule may be within the rule-making power of the Court, it might be
"substantive" under the Erie doctrine and inapplicable in diversity
cases. The formidable task of determining what is "substantive"
and what is "procedural" has produced very uncertain results. In
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York25 the Supreme Court held that issues
should be considered "substantive" if the outcome with regard to
those issues significantly affected the result of the litigation. Literally
applied, the "outcome determinative" test espoused in Guaranty
Trust would inject a far broader meaning into "substantive" than
was intended under the enabling act and would render many evi-
dence rules useless in diversity cases. Fortunately the test has not
20 See PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RuLEs 35-36, 48; Degnan, supra
note 10, at 277-82; note 15 supra. "The fact that twenty one of the eighty six rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal with the subject of evidence shows with-
out question that the draftsmen regarded the rules of evidence as procedural." Ladd,
supra note 10, at 696 & n.14.
2128 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). See note 15 supra.
2 2 See PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RuLEs 39.
2304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 The Erie case particularly gave renewed vitality to the Rules of Decisions Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). See Ladd, supra note 10, at 695; note 13 supra.
25 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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been used to its full potential 20 and, in fact, has been modified by
the Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op.27 The Court
determined that the federal policy favoring trial by jury should not
yield to a contrary state policy merely because the outcome might be
affected. However, in stating that it would look at "affirmative
countervailing considerations" 28 the Court did not repudiate the
outcome determinative test and replace it with a policy balancing
test.29 Notwithstanding the confusion manifested in the Guaranty
Trust and Byrd cases concerning the exact effect of Erie, it is fairly
well settled that most evidence law is procedural within the meaning
of that case and could be adopted for use in the federal courts.80
20 Cf. Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 437
(1958); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity
Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443, 446 (1962). A further indication of the above con-
clusion is the fact that the federal rules have been held almost entirely beyond the
scope of Erie.
2 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See generally PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE
RuLEs 37; 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 138.
28 356 U.S. at 537.
29 The Court in Byrd merely provided that in instances where there was a counter-
vailing federal policy, that policy would be taken into consideration. See Smith, supra
note 26, at 449-53; Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tomkins: A Projection, 48 IOWA L. REV. 248,
271 (1963). One commentator has criticized the current study for placing too heavy
a reliance upon Byrd. Degnan, supra note 10, at 290-99.
Several lower courts have taken comfort from Byrd in making extensive use of the
illusory rules of evidence in federal equity courts to admit evidence under rule 43 (a).
See, e.g., Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960);
see also text accompanying note 16 supra. The current federal study places considerable
reliance on Monarch. See PRELIMINARY RErPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RuLEs 37. At least
one treatise has given full support to Monarch. See 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra
note 16, at § 962. See generally Comment, Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissi-
bility of Evidence and the Implications of the "Erie" Doctrine, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1049 (1962).
1o "Rules of evidence should be treated within the domain of procedural law."
5 MOORE 43.02[2], at 1310; see also Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Pro-
cedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 467 (1957).
The full force and effect of the Erie doctrine will remain unknown until the
Supreme Court determines whether that doctrine is based on a policy or a constitu-
tional requirement. The "affirmative consideration" test enunciated in Byrd and the use
of a policy balancing approach in some lower courts, note 29 supra, seems to further
necessitate an answer to the above question. See Smith, supra note 26, at 465-70. For
articles supporting the view that Erie is constitutionally required, see, e.g., Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 509-10 (1954); Hill,
supra note 26, at 437-38. But see, e.g., Clark, State Law in The Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1946); Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405, 468-69 (1955); Kur-
land, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity




Presumptions is an area in which it will be particularly difficult to
promulgate a uniform code of evidence for the federal district
courts. In considering adoption of the Uniform Rules with regard
to presumptions for use in the federal courts, two problems will
have to be given special attention: are the rules subject to the stric-
tures of Erie and thus controlled by state law in diversity cases;
and are they substantive within the meaning of the enabling act
and thus beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court?
The problems created by presumptions led Professor Thayer to
remark that "among things so beset with ambiguity there is abundant
opportunity for him to stumble and fall who does not pick his way
and walk with caution."31 In light of the attendant difficulties some
effort will be expended at this point to explain the workings of pre-
sumptions before considering the unique problems that will be
encountered in framing rules for their use in the federal courts.
WORKINGS OF PRESUMPTIONS
Much of the confusion concerning presumptions has resulted
because they are inextricably intertwined with "burden of proof."
In fact, a presumption can properly be defined as a vehicle for
distributing the "burden of proof" among the parties. Thayer
first clearly enunciated the dissection of burden of proof that was
adopted by the Uniform Rules. 32 Under this analysis, burden of
proof is divided into burden of persuasion and burden of producing
evidence. The burden of persuasion requires the party upon whom
this burden rests to convince or persuade the jury by a certain
quantum of evidence that a certain fact exists or does not exist.as
1 THAYER 352. Professor Morgan has stated that "every writer of sufficient intelli-
gence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject matter has approached the topic of
presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair."
Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937).
11THAYER 355-64. The definitional problem is particularly confusing because
"there is an undiscriminating use of the phrase [burden of proof], perhaps more com-
mon than either of the other two [burden of persuasion and burden of producing evi-
dence], in which it may mean either or both of the others." Id. at 355.
3""'Burden of Proof' means the obligation of a party to meet the requirements of a
rule of law that the fact be proved either by a preponderance of the evidence or by
clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be.
Burden of proof is synonymous with 'burden of persuasion."' UNIFORM RuLE OF EVI-
DENCE 1(4). New Jersey has adopted this definition. N.J. Stat. 2A:84A-5 (1961). In
this comment the term "burden of persuasion" will be used in an effort to avoid
confusion of terms. See note 32 supra. For an interesting and strongly argued view
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The burden of producing evidence requires only that the party upon
whom it rests introduce some evidence or suffer the risk of a directed
verdict or a peremptory instruction to the jury.34 Considerable dis-
pute has arisen as to whether a presumption "places"35 either or
both of the "burdens of proof" upon the party against whom it
operates.
A presumption is defined in rule 13 of the Uniform Rules as a
rule of law which requires that one fact, the presumed fact, be as-
sumed when another fact, the basic fact, is established.3 6 Although it
rests upon the basic fact, the presumption is not dependent upon a
process of inference and is not evidence to be considered by the
jury.3 7 The basic fact may be established in several ways.38 However,
that burden of persuasion should be expressed in terms of degree of belief rather than
"preponderance," "clear and convincing" and "reasonable doubt," see McBaine, Burden
of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 13 (1954); see also McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Degree of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944).
" "'Burden of producing evidence' means the obligations of a party to introduce
evidence when necessary to avoid the risk of a directed verdict or peremptory finding
against him on a material issue of fact." UNIFORt RULE OF EVIDENCE 1 (5). New
Jersey has adopted the essence of this rule. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-6 (Supp. 1963).
11 The courts and legal writers normally use the word "shifts." This comment will
employ the term "places," since it more nearly expresses the actual operation of a pre-
sumption, particularly with reference to the burden of persuasion. In fact, the burden
of persuasion does not come into play until after all the evidence has been presented.
See McCoIuIsCK, LAv oF EVIDENCE 639 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK].
,"A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which
requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action." UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 13. This definition was adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court in In the Matter of Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277, 289
n.15, 293 P.2d 682, 690 n.15 (1956). Uniform Rule 13 is sufficiently broad to include
the "conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presumption, which is not in fact a presumption
but a rule of substantive law. MORGAN, MAGUIRE 9: WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 439 (4th ed.
1957); 9 WIGMORE § 2492; Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 17, 24
(1930). Since the only "true" presumption is a rebuttable one and the other Uniform
Rules apply only to rebuttable presumptions, it might be wise to put the words "a
rebuttable" before the word "assumption" in Uniform Rule 13. See RrE.oRT OF TiE
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMIrE ON EVIDENCE 45 (1963). By the use of the
word "requires" the above definition excludes inferences, which should not be con-
fused with presumptions. "The distinction is between a matter of logic and experience
[inference] and a rule of law [presumption]." Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L.
REV. 391, 392 (1956).
37 See note 36 supra. The rule that a presumption is not evidence is a long stand-
ing rule which is not seriously disputed, at least in the federal courts. See Agnew v.
United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897), limiting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)
("presumption" of innocence) discussed in Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516, 522
(5th Cir. 1955); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935)
(presumption against suicide); Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 6, 192 AtI. 184
(1937); Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and
Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1954); McBaine, Presumptions: Are They
[Vol. 1964: 867
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in those instances where the jury must decide if there is sufficient evi-
dence to establish the basic fact, problems in framing instructions
can result.39 Nonetheless, the judiciary or the legislature decides
whether a certain basic fact will justify assumption of the presumed
fact; the jury merely decides whether or not the proponent of the
presumption has offered sufficient evidence to establish the basic fact.
Several grounds for permitting the basic fact to support the presumed
fact have been recognized by the courts.40 Although probability or
logical connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact has
undoubtedly been the greatest single factor in the recognition of
presumptions, it must be remembered that they do not arise by a
process of inference. Presumptions are primarily devices for distrib-
uting the "burdens of proof" and are only secondarily aids to
reasoning. The Supreme Court has apparently not recognized the
above distinction and has saddled the courts with a test requiring a
"rational connection" between the basic and presumed facts when
adjudicating the constitutionality of statutory presumptions.41
Evidence?, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 519 (1938). But see 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 34 (1842);
Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931). Nonetheless, the jury
is free to draw the normal inferences from the basic fact, if established, whether or
not the presumed fact has been assumed. THAYER 545; MCCORMICK 650-52; Morgan,
Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 69
(1933).
's The basic fact can be established by the pleadings, by stipulation of the parties,
by judicial notice or by the production of sufficient evidence. UNIFOR RULE OF EvI-
DENcE 13, comment; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENC E rule 702 (1942); Morgan, The Law of
Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 481, 495 (1946).
"' The judge must instruct the jury that, if it finds there is sufficient evidence to
establish the basic fact, then the presumed fact must be assumed; and if there is not
sufficient evidence to establish the basic fact then the jury is to forget about the pre-
sumed fact. Most authorities agree with Judge Learned Hand that "if the trial is
properly conducted, the presumption will not be mentioned at all." Alpine Forward-
ing Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2nd Cir. 1932). See Morgan, supra note
31, at 281; Morgan, supra note 37. Contra, McCoRAaICK 663-72; Reaugh, Presumptions
and the Burden of Proof, 56 ILL. L. REV. 819, 830-48 (1942).
4o0Four grounds are: probability or logical connection; peculiar knowledge or access
to evidence; procedural convenience; and social and economic policy. See McCORMICK
641; MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 440-43.
,1 "Under our decision, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed .... ." Tot
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). (Emphasis added.) Western & At. R.R. v.
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 643-44 (1929); Mobile, Jackson & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed,
219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). This test, at least in the context of civil cases, unduly re-
stricts the work of the presumption and in effect makes them inferences. Tot was a
criminal case, and most writers relying to a large degree on dictum in Morrison v.
California, 291 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1934), have attempted to limit the effect of Tot to the
criminal sphere where there is some basis for the test. However, the test is one that
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The above definition of a presumption as a rule of law requiring
that the presumed fact be assumed from the basic fact is generally
agreed upon by courts and commentators. They also agree that the
presumed fact must be accepted as true until the party against whom
the presumption operates has introduced rebutting evidence to show
the non-existence of the presumed fact.42 However, at this juncture
agreement ends and confusion, chaos and conflict begin. One major
disagreement concerns what quantum of evidence of the non-exist-
ence of the presumed fact must be introduced to rebut the presump-
tion. Also, statements as to the effect to be given presumptions are
as varied as the number of courts which have attempted this Sisyphean
feat.43
will continue to give trouble until the Court clearly articulates its scope. In fact, the
rational connection test led to Uniform Rule 14 (b). See generally McCoRNUCK 654-63;
Morgan, Tot v. United States: Constitutional Restrictions on the Statutory Presump.
tions, 56 HIAv. L. REv. 1324 (1943); Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory
Presumptions, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 527 (1955). For a good general discussion of
statutory presumptions see Brosman, The Statutory Presumption (pts. 1 & 2), 5 TuL. L.
REv. 17, 178 (1930-31).
42 9 WiemoRE § 2491; Gausewitz, supra note 36, at 393; Morgan, Presumptions, 10
RUTGERs L. REv. 512, 516 (1956); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16
So. CAL. L. REv. 245, 246-47 (1943).
,"3,Perhaps no topic of the law has perplexed the courts more than the scope and
effect of legal presumptions. The complexities and subtleties of the subject, enhanced
no doubt by the variant theories regarding them and the confusion of thought mani-
fested in the discussion of the questions incident to them, have given rise to a condition
that has been characterized as 'a welter of loose language and discordant decisions.'"
Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 109 Vt. 6, 22, 192 At. 184, 191 (1937).
(Emphasis added.)
Professor Morgan has found eight effects that courts have accorded presumptions.
Of the eight, Morgan and others have given serious consideration to three. Under
the first of these views, the mere introduction of evidence which would justify a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact dissipates the presumption. This is the
Thayer-Wigmore rule adopted by the Model Code. See notes 44-48 infra and ac-
companying text. This approach was adopted in Uniform Rule 14 (b) for presump-
tions where the basic fact has no probative value as to the existence of the presumed
fact. See notes 53 & 54 infra and accompanying text. The second view holds that the
artificial effect remains unless evidence of the non-existence of the presumed fact con-
vinces the jury that its non-existence is at least as probable as is its existence. Morgan
rejected this approach as too confusing, but Professor McBaine argues that this is
the proper view. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 13 (1954).
The third view is similar to the second and differs only in that the artificial effect
remains until the jury is convinced that the non-existence is more probable than its
existence. This is the so called "Pennsylvania rule" which Morgan supported and
which was adopted in Uniform Rule 14(a) for presumptions where the basic fact
has some probative value of the presumed fact. See notes 51 & 52 infra and accom-
panying text. For a good discussion of the "Pennsylvania rule" and the present law of
presumptions in Pennsylvania, see Levin, supra note 37, at 12-20. Actually Morgan
suggested the combination of the first and third views discussed above that was
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The classic definition of the function of a presumption was
articulated by Thayer44 and evangelized to the legal community by
Wigmore. 45 Under this approach, a presumption fixes the burden
of producing evidence upon the party against whom it operates and
"this alone, appears to be characteristic and essential work of a
presumption." '46 The presumption will be successfully rebutted by
the introduction of any evidence which is sufficient to support the
non-existence of the presumed fact.4 7 In effect, the presumption re-
quires the party against whom it operates to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to avoid a directed verdict. The Thayer-Wigmore theory was
adopted by the drafters of the Model Code48 over a strong protest.
The protesters, lead by Professor Morgan, argued that under
the Thayer-Wigmore theory a presumption is an anomaly, for it is
strong enough to determine the outcome of an entire case, yet com-
pletely disappears with the introduction of evidence which reason-
able men could disbelieve. 49 Morgan proposed that a presumption
should have the effect of placing the burden of persuasion of the issue
adopted in Uniform Rule 14. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code
of Evidence, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 145, 162-63 (1940). See generally Morgan, supra note 31,
at 259-71; Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IowA L. REv. 413, 417
(1939).
TER 313-52.
"9 Wxcmsoxt §§ 2487, 2491.
C THAYER at 337.
""The evidence to overcome a presumption must be credible, substantial, sufficient
to support a finding .... Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 18 (1959). See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1935). However, this evidence need not be be-
lieved by the judge who determines whether or not the presumption has been re-
butted. Some courts, in an effort to give the presumption added strength, have asked
the jury to judge the credibility of the evidence and to render this decision. See, e.g.,
O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 At. 486 (1934). It is submitted that such a
task is conceptually difficult and unduly confuses the jury.
8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 701-04 (1942); see generally Laughlin, The Loca-
tion of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. PiTr. L. REv. 3 (1956); Laughlin, In Support of
the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. Rlv. 195 (1953). See Morgan, Further
Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245, 259 (1943), where the author
gives lukewarm support to the Model Code approach to presumptions.
0 At the 1941 meeting of the American Law Institute, Morgan stated: "What I
object to in the Thayerian rule is this: the creation of the presumption for a reason
that the court deems sufficient, a rule of law if this basic fact stands by itself there
must be a finding of a presumed fact, whether the jury would ordinarily find it from
the basic fact or not; but then the total destruction of the presumption just the
minute some testimony is put in which anybody can disbelieve, which comes from
interested witnesses, and which is the sort that is usually disbelieved." 18 AMERICAN
LAW INsTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 221 (1941).
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under consideration upon the party against whom it operates. 0
This approach was taken by the drafters of the Uniform Rules and
effectuated one of the most drastic departures from the Model Code.
Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules contains the essence of Morgan's
theory. Under rule 14 (a), if the basic fact has some logical value in
proving the presumed fact, "the burden of establishing the non-
existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the
presumption operates." 51  The phrase "burden of establishing,"
although nowhere defined, undoubtedly means the burden of per-
suading the jury of the non-existence of the presumed fact by a
preponderance of the evidence.52 Rule 14 (b) limits the effect to be
accorded a presumption in those few instances where the basic fact
has no logical value in proving the presumed fact.53 In such in-
"oAs reporter for the Model Code, Morgan proposed that such a view be adopted
by the Model Code. Morgan, Forward, Model Code of Evidence 57 (1942). However,
the recommendation made by Morgan and the advisory committee was rejected by
the members of the American Law Institute in favor of the Thayer-Wigmore theory
after extensive debate. 18 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 197-228 (1941).
Morgan was not the first commentator to advocate a departure from strict reliance
on the Thayer-Wigmore view. See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions
of Law upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); Chafee, The Progress
of the Law, 1919-1921: Evidence, 35 HARV. L. REv. 302, 313 (1922). However, it was
not until Morgan wrote the first of his many articles on presumptions that the Thayer-
Wigmore doctrine came under sustained attack. See Morgan, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. Rxv. 906 (1931); see also Morgan, supra note 37;
Morgan supra note 31; Morgan 9- Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evi-
dence, 50 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1937). For almost a decade Morgan urged a strict
"Pennsylvania rule" (see note 43 supra) approach to presumptions, but in 1939 he
suggested that a combination of this view with the Thayer-Wigmore rule might be
appropriate. Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IoWA L. REv. 413,
435 (1939). Under the latter proposal the Thayer-Wigmore rule would be used
where the basic fact had no value in proving the presumed fact, while the "Penn-
sylvania rule" would be employed where the basic fact had probative value of the
presumed fact. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence,
89 U. PA. L. Rav. 145, 162-63 (1940); 18 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 199-200
(1941). Although rejected by the drafters of the Model Code, this latter approach
was adopted in Uniform Rule 14. See notes 51 & 52 infra and accompanying text;
Morgan, Presumptions, 10 Rtrroms L. Rav. 512 (1956). See generally Helman, Pre-
sumptions, 22 CAN. B. REV. 118 (1944).
" "Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are conclusive or irref-
utable under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the facts from which the
presumption is derived have any probative value as evidence of the existence of the
presumed fact, the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establishing
the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presump-
tion operates...." UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(a). See generally Levin supra note
37, at 20-24; Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 512 (1956).
52 Morgan, supra note 51, at 513-14. But see McBaine, supra note 43, at 24-28.
51 "Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are conclusive or irref-
[Vol. 1964: 867
PRESUMPTIONS
stances only the burden of producing evidence is placed upon the
opponent, thus avoiding some of the difficulties created by rule
14 (a) when there is no such "rational connection." 54
Uniform rule 16, which should be read in conjunction with rule
14, makes clear that extraordinary presumptions "shall not be
affected by Rules 14 or 15 and the burden of proof [persuasion] to
overcome it continues on the party against whom the presumption
operates."5 5 The prime example is the presumption of legitimacy,
which is easy to attack, but which, for sound policy reasons, falls
only in the face of the most convincing evidence.-5
utable under the rules of law from which they arise .... (b) if the facts from which
the presumption arises have no probative value as evidence of the presumed fact,
the presumption does not exist when evidence is introduced which would support a
finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact, and the fact which would otherwise
be presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly as if no presumption was
or had ever been involved." UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(b).
"'See Morgan, supra note 51, at 513; notes 41, 43 & 50 supra. Model Code of Evi-
dence rule 704, comment at 314 (1942), indicates that the drafters of the Model Code felt
the Thayer-Wigmore approach to presumptions would avoid the constitutional difficulties
created by Western & Ad. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) and Mobile, Jack-
son & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). This is precisely the reason that
Morgan shifted from a pure "Pennsylvania rule" approach and urged a combination
of that rule with the Thayer-WVigmore theory. 18 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEED-
INcs 206-07, 222 (1941); see note 50 supra.
For a proposal that no distinction be drawn on the basis of rational connection be-
tween the basic and presumed fact, see REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
COMMNITrE ON EVIDENCE 50 (1963). The New Jersey committee urged that Uniform
Rule 14 (b) creates needless confusion and recommended that it be disregarded. It
is submitted that such an approach, although possibly theoretically satisfying, ignores
the present status of the law. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); note 41
supra.
r5 "A presumption, which by a rule of law may be overcome only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence, shall not be affected by Rules
14 or 15 and the burden of proof to overcome it continues on the party against whom
the presumption operates." UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 16.
cG The comment to Uniform Rule 16 indicates that the so called presumption of
innocence is not to be disturbed by Uniform Rules 13-15. Since the state always has
the burden beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, that presumption is
mere surplusage. See, e.g., 9 WICMORE § 2511.
Uniform Rule 15 provides that when the basic facts of two inconsistent presump-
tions are established "the judge shall apply the presumption which is founded on the
weightier consideration of policy and logic. If there is no such preponderance both
presumptions shall be disregarded." Under the pure Thayer-Wigmore theory, incon-
sistent presumptions are said to always cancel one another. 9 WIGMMORE § 2493. One
report has suggested that the last sentence of Uniform Rule 15 be omitted and that
the jury be instructed as to both presumptions if they are equally balanced. REPORT
OF THE Nmw JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 51-52 (1963). It is sub-
mitted that such a rule would unduly complicate the judge's function and might lead
to some very confusing jury instructions.
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Rules for the Federal Courts
In this section special attention will be given to the very real
problems facing adoption of the Uniform Rules approach to pre-
sumptions for use in the federal district courts. In addition, the
Thayer-Wigmore approach will be analyzed to determine if that
theory might prove more acceptable and feasible for use in the
district courts. Finally, certain general conclusions based upon this
analysis will be set forth as to what rules for presumptions might be
adopted in the federal courts.
In the preceding discussion of the operation of presumptions,
it was stated as a general rule that a presumption "is not evidence to
be considered by the jury."T Unfortunately, not all courts adhere
to this view, as is illustrated by a recent federal court case wherein
an issue was whether a state presumption of accidental death was
evidence to be weighed by the jury.5 8 In upholding the district
court's application of the state rule that the "presumption" was to
be accorded the status of evidence, the Supreme Court stated that
"under the Erie rule, presumptions (and their effects) and the bur-
den of proof are 'substantive ....' '59 Since the Court accepted the
view that the "presumption" involved was to be accorded an arti-
ficial status as evidence, the holding that it was substantive within
the meaning of Erie is understandable. As evidence the "presump-
tion" could affect both the outcome of the litigation and a sub-
stantial state policy.60
Since the Uniform Rules approach to presumptions gives them
the appearance of evidence,61 doubts might be raised as to the effect
57 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
" Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959). In Dick an action to re-
cover under a double indemnity clause was instituted in a North Dakota state court
and removed to the federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. The district
court rejected an argument that it should apply the Thayer-Wigmore theory, id. at 443
n.4, and instead applied the North Dakota rule enunciated in Svikovec v. Woodman
Acc. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 264, 285 N.W. 447, 449 (1939), which gives "the presumption
in favor of accidental death the weight of affirmative evidence." The law of pre-
sumptions in North Dakota is confused in part because of an archaic statute. N.D.
CODE ANN. 31-11-01 to -03 (1960). California, Montana, Nevada and Oregon have
similar statutory provisions.
"0 359 U.S. at 446.
"See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938), where the Court re-
fused to apply the Montana rule that presumptions are evidence and held that "the
presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence." Id. at 171.
61 "[T]he presumption continues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-
existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presumption
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of the Erie doctrine in diversity cases. This resemblance to evidence
is caused primarily by the fact that the Uniform Rules presumption
places the burden of persuasion upon the party against whom it
operates. Morgan, faced with the long standing rule that a pre-
sumption is not evidence,62 has argued that in almost all cases the
jury will be persuaded one way or the other and that it really does
not matter who has the burden of persuasion. Thus, Morgan argues,
the Uniform Rules presumption is merely a rule of procedure which
determines the outcome of litigation only when the jury is in equi-
librium.63 However, it is submitted that such an argument involves
a mere play on words, for when a presumed fact must be overcome
by a preponderence of the evidence to be rebutted, it clearly has the
effect of evidence whatever the nomenclature one uses to designate
it.0- Thus, Morgan's argument appears to be subject to doubt and
the Uniform Rules presumption might well be termed "substantive"
within the meaning of Erie.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that "bur-
den of proof," at least in the sense of the burden of persuasion, is sub-
stantive within Erie.65 Thus, whether or not the Uniform Rules
operates...." UNIFORMr RULES OF EVIDENCE 14 (a). Professor McBaine argues that such
a rule is not the equivalent of making a presumption evidence, because presumptions
"may be given sufficient force and vitality to survive against contrary evidence that
the jury does not believe." McBaine, supra note 37, at 548. McBaine seems to feel
that the jury will be able to look only at the rebutting evidence and determine on
the basis of the credibility of that evidence whether or not the presumption has been
dissipated. Although this may be a theoretically sound argument, it is submitted
that the jury will, in fact, weigh the presumed fact as evidence against the rebuttal
evidence in determining whether or not the presumption has been rebutted.
02 See note 37 supra.
03"If the jury is satisfied either way, it makes no difference who has the burden
of persuasion, but when the mind of the jury.., is in equilibrium, then the party
having the burden of persuasion loses; so that the most effect that this gives to a pre-
sumption when evidence is introduced contrary to it is the effect which a piece of evi-
dence would have that would throw the case out of equilibrium...." 18 AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 221 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
0, "It is sometimes said that the presumption will tip the scale when the evidence
is balanced. But, in truth, nothing tips the scale but evidence, and a presumption-
being a legal rule or a legal conclusion-is not evidence." THAYER 576 (Storrs Lecture
1896). This language was quoted with approval in the leading case of Watkins v.
Prudential Ins. Co. 315 Pa. 497, 503, 173 Ad. 644, 647 (1934), Annot., 95 A.L.R. 869
(1935). See generally Bernstein, The Presumption of Due Care-An Analysis, 20 PA.
B. ASs'N Q. 24, 29-30 (1948).
65 See, e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Cities Serv. Oil
Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939), 88 U. PA. L. REv. 482 (1940) (approving), 18
TExAs L. REV. 226 (1940) (disapproving); Desjardins v. Desjardins, 308 F.2d 111, 116
n.3 (6th Cir. 1962); 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 964
Vol. 1964: 867]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
presumption is "evidence," the fact that it affects the placing of the
burden of persuasion would make its application to diversity cases
unlikely.66 Obviously, the placing of this burden is of great practical
consequence, and anything during the trial which might cause it
to be placed upon a different party could affect the outcome and a
substantial state policy. Indeed, the burden of persuasion is so well
established as being "substantive" within Erie that the Uniform
Rules approach to presumptions could not be used by the federal
courts in diversity cases.
This raises the question whether the Uniform Rules approach
makes the presumption "substantive" within the meaning of the
enabling act.67 If not, then possibly the Uniform Rules approach
could be adopted and applied in nondiversity, criminal, and ad-
miralty cases, and thereby effectuate at least a partial unification. 8
While "substantive" as used in the enabling act does not have the
same meaning it has in Erie, there is no precise definition of what is
subsumed within the statutory usage of the term. To say that the
term means that which is not procedural merely begs the question.
(1961); 5 MOORE 43.08. In the PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES 39,
it was noted that "certain other matters usually treated under the law of evidence,
have been held to be so far substantive as not to be within the rule-making power,
for example, burden of proof." The Report was not explicit in how it was using
"burden of proof," but apparently burden of persuasion was the meaning intended.
66 There are some presumptions "which shift the burden of proof and since as
noted above burden of proof [burden of persuasion] is substantive such state created
presumptions must be applied in non-federal cases." 5 MOORE 43.03, 1337-38. Dean
Ladd recently remarked that under the Uniform Rules "rebuttable presumptions
derived from facts having any probative value shift the burden of proof [burden of
persuasion] to the party against whom the presumption operates to establish the non-
existence of the presumed fact. The Erie case would probably control and in diversity
cases prevent the use of a presumption contrary to state law." Ladd, Uniform Evidence
Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REV. 692, 698 (1963).
6728 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). See note 15 supra. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1958)
(criminal procedure), 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1958) (admiralty procedure).
68 See note 67 supra. "[E]ven though the Erie doctrine applies in federal civil ac-
tions and causes trouble there as to uniform rules of evidence, it does not apply in
criminal or in admiralty cases." Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DICK.
L. REV. 381, 386 (1963). This approach has merit in light of the fact that of the civil
cases instituted in 1962 in the federal district courts (not including land condemna-
tions, District of Columbia insanity, and local jurisdiction cases), only about one third
were diversity cases. (Diversity-34.8%, United States-37.6%, Federal Question-
24.97). Yet, when the criminal cases are included diversity cases account for only about
one fourth of the cases brought to the trial stage. (Diversity-26.7%, United States-
11.5%, Federal Question-12.7%, Criminal-49.1%). DIR. OF ADM. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS
ANN. RPa,. 104-11 (1962). See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 275, 287 (1962), where the author questions the wisdom of adopting rules
if diversity cases cannot be included.
[Vol. 1964: 867
PRESUMPTIONS
However, it is submitted that a rule which affects an element as im-
portant to a case as the positioning of the burden of persuasion goes
beyond what legitimately can be called procedural and affects the
substantive rights of the parties.69 Although federal rule 8 (c) has
successfully been attacked as "substantive" within Erie for placing
the burden of persuasion of certain defenses upon the defendant,70
it has not been declared to be beyond the Supreme Court's rule-
making power.71 While this fact could be urged as grounds for the
adoption of the Uniform Rules approach, such an argument can be
questioned. One possible distinction is that federal rule 8 (c) de-
termines where the burden of persuasion rests before the trial
begins, while the Uniform Rules presumption can cause that burden
to be placed upon a different party while the trial is in progress.
Thus, the Uniform Rules presumption is arguably "substantive"
within the meaning of the enabling act and beyond the rule-making
power of the Court.72
Since the Uniform Rules definition of the effect of a presumption
will have to be abandoned for use in the trial of diversity cases and
might have to be abandoned for non-diversity cases, the Thayer-
Wigmore theory should be considered for adoption in the federal
courts.73 Even Morgan has acknowledged that the Thayer-Wigmore
approach is the only logical alternative to the Uniform Rules.7 4
"°But see Degnan, supra note 68, at 283 n.35; Ladd, supra note 66, at 698, n.20.70 See 2 MooRE 8.27[2]. In Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. (E.D. Ill. 1938), the
court rejected plaintiff's argument that the placing of the burden of proving contributory
negligence was a matter of procedure and held "that the absence of contributory negli-
gence is made an essential part of the plaintiff's cause of action by the substantive law
of Illinois and this substantive rule, declared by the courts of Illinois, must be
recognized and followed by the federal courts." Id. at 5. In Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 117 (1943), the Supreme Court stated that "Rule 8 (c) covers only the manner
of pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a
question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases. .. must apply."
71 Apparently federal rule 8 (c) is still applicable in non-diversity cases. See Willie
v. Harris County, 202 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (S.D. Tex., 1962), where the court stated
that "this line of reasoning [no state action] assumes the characteristics of an affirmative
defense, which must be both pleaded and proved with particularity."
72 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
73 After stating that Erie "would probably control" the Uniform Rules approach
to presumptions in diversity cases, Dean Ladd noted that "if the rules would be like
those in the Model Code of Evidence [rule 704] which cause a presumption to disap-
pear as soon as rebutting testimony is introduced, an opposite result could be pos-
sible." Ladd, supra note 66, at 698.
7, Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IowA L. REv. 413, 435 (1939).
See also Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CAL. L. Rlv. 245, 265
(1943), where the author stated that "although not giving complete rational satisfaction,
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Moreover, a review of the cases reveals that, in almost all instances
where presumptions have been held substantive within the meaning
of Erie, they were either accorded the status of evidence, 7 or "bur-
den of proof" was used in the sense of burden of persuasion.76 In fact,
if there is presently a rule for presumptions in the federal courts,
it is very close to the Thayer-Wigmore approach.77 Further-
more, several leading commentators have suggested that this ap-
proach might be feasible for general use in the federal courts.
78
The Thayer-Wigmore theory is procedural within the meaning of
the enabling act and could be adopted by the Supreme Court.70
This approach places only the burden of producing sufficient evi-
dence to support the non-existence of the presumed fact upon the
party against whom it operates. Regulating management of this
burden is essential to the conduct of an efficient trial and the effect
of the fact that it may "shift" from one party to the other during
Rules 703 and 704 of the American Law Institute MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, if adoptcd,
will dear up the confusion and give both courts and legislatures a norm for future
action."
"See, e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Western & Ad.
Ri.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
" See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 208 (1939); British American Assur. Co. v. Bowen, 134 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1943);
Rdst v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1940).
" See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 (1938) (presumption against
suicide). "Once the employer has carried his burden by offering testimony sufficient to
justify a finding of suicide, the presumption falls out of the case." Del Vecchio v.
Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286 (1935). The principle that the presumption "against suicide
shifts only the burden of going forward with the evidence, and does not change the
ultimate burden of proof, is so well settled that it scarcely needs a citation of authority."
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See also Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935); McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 13, 22 n.23 (1954).
78 See Ladd, supra note 66. "Burden of proof rules and presumption rules are of
course intimately related. Where they do not operate to set a minimum quantum of
proof in particular situations but merely fix or shift the burden of going forward with
the evidence it is arguable that the law of the forum state need not be followed." Hill,
State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 66, 72 n.26
(1955). (Emphasis added.) See also 5 MOORE 48.08.
19 "The doctrine of the burden of proof has two aspects, procedural and sub.
stantive. As a matter of procedure it requires the party carrying the burden to come
forward with its proofs. As a matter of substantive law the term is frequently used to
indicate the fact that the burdened party's proof must outweigh the opposing proof in
order to establish the claim asserted." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 270 F.2d 50,
59 (2d Cir. 1959). (Emphasis added.) See generally Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.
v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935); notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
It must be remembered that the question of whether or not the presumption is
procedural or substantive "involves a federal matter upon which state law does not
control in applying Erie." 5 MOORE 43.08, at 1337.
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the course of the trial appears inconsequential. The burden of
persuasion, on the other hand, applies only when all the evidence
is in,80 and although it is very likely to affect substantive rights,
it lacks the procedural nature of the burden of producing evidence.
However, the fact that the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine is pro-
cedural in nature does not prevent the application of Erie if the
presumption will affect the outcome of the litigation. Under a
strict "outcome determinative" test the placing of this slight burden
could be considered "substantive"; but in fact, the doctrine of
Guaranty Trust has not been carried this far.8 ' This slight burden
appears no more likely to affect the substantive rights of the parties
and the outcome of the litigation than do rules for the admission of
hearsay evidence, which are acknowledged to be procedural. 2 More-
over, the limiting language of Byrd may serve to dispel any lingering
doubts concerning possible implications of the Guaranty Trust
doctrine.83 Employing the Byrd rationale, one could argue that
there is a countervailing federal policy favoring uniform operation
of the presumption as a procedural device to help determine which
party has the burden of producing evidence to avoid a directed
verdict. Although not a policy of overwhelming siguificance, it is
one necessary for the smooth operation of trials in the federal district
courts and would transcend no important state policy.
Furthermore, the Thayer-Wigmore approach is more likely to be
accepted for use in the trial of criminal cases in the federal courts
than would the approach found in the Uniform Rules.84 While
rules for criminal procedure would be adopted under a different
act,"5 uniformity between civil and criminal evidence rules appears
80 See note 35 supra.
"See notes 26 & 27 supra.
'1 Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 1961);
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE RuLEs 40. "It is hard to see how any of the
hearsay exceptions could be classified as substantive law under the Erie doctrine...."
Ladd, supra note 66, at 709.
11 "Therefore, were 'outcome' the only consideration, a strong case might appear
for saying that the federal court should follow the state practice. But there are affirma-
tive countervailing considerations at work here." Byrd v. Blue Ridge Co-op., 356 U.S.
525, 537 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
" The defendant has "the burden of going forward with the evidence. When he
has raised a reasonable doubt he has met this burden. He does not also have the
burden of persuasion." Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in the Federal
Criminal Cases, 31 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 30, 45 (1963). For a general discussion of
presumptions and criminal law, see O'Toole, Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal
Law, 11 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 167 (1937).
"r Such rules would be adopted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1958). The comment
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to be a worthy goal."6 Since the government traditionally must prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Uniform Rules theory of
presumptions would at best be ineffectual in the criminal cases. In-
deed, placing the burden of persuasion upon the defendant might
well violate the defendant's rights.8 7 The comment to Uniform Rule
16 assures that the so called presumption of innocence is not to be
affected by Uniform Rule 14, but, in fact this adds nothing, for any
presumption in favor of the accused is mere surplusage s8 The only
useful presumptions against the accused in a criminal case are those
which are grounded in "rational connection" and sound policy,
and which will be negated by the introduction of rebutting evidence.
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, adopted pursuant to the above enabling
act, encouraged a decisional reform for criminal evidence law, but the Supreme Court
has refused to follow such a course. "We concur in the general opinion of courts, text-
writers and the profession that much of this law [criminal evidence] is archaic, para-
doxical and full of compromises .... But somehow it has proved a workable even if
clumsy system when moderated by the discretionary controls in the hands of a wise
and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is
more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to estab-
lish a national edifice." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). (Emphasis
added.)
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (5) (1962) proposes an approach to presumptions which
is neither a Thayer-Wigmore approach nor that adopted by the Uniform Rules, al-
though it is probably closer to the Thayer-Wigmore approach. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.13, comment at 114-17 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
" See note 68 supra; see generally Orfield, supra note 84.
'7 "Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in criminal
law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence .... It is on the prosecution
from the beginning to the end of the trial and applies to every element necessary to
constitute the crime." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895). See also
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275-76 (1952) (conclusive presumption); Or-
field, supra note 84, at 49. However, "the burden of going forward with the evidence
at some stage of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant, but only after the
State has 'proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel
what has been proved with excuse of explanation" sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the jury. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958).
It is necessary that the criminal presumption be based upon a rational connection
between the fact proved and the presumed fact. See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S.
178, 183 (1925); Davis v. United States, 274 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
806 (1960); Government of Virgin Islands v. Torres, 161 F. Supp. 699 (D. Vir. I. 1958);
Orfield, supra note 84, at 70, indicates that in some cases the "burden" could be placed
upon the defendant; Morgan, Some Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CAL.
L. REv. 245, 259 (1943).
88 See, e.g., 9 Wigmore § 2511; note 56 supra. The same is true for the so called
presumption of due care in jurisdictions where the burden of proving contributory
negligence is on the defendant. "The statutory presumption of due care is like a
handkerchief thrown over something also covered by a blanket." Brown v. Henderson,
285 Mass. 192, 194, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934); Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WAsn.
L. REv. 71, 73-74 (1940).
[Vol. 1964: 867
PRESUMPTIONS
For example, the presumption against insanity requires that the
defendant produce some evidence of insanity if the presumption
is to be rebutted. In the federal courts and in most state courts,
this burden is met very easily, resulting in the imposition of a burden
of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt upon the state.89 This
is, in fact, the basic operation of the Thayer-Wigmore presumption.
Thus, the less rigorous Thayer-Wigmore approach would prove
useful and practical, particularly in light of the fact that the verdict
in a criminal case is never directed in favor of the government.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Thayer-Wigmore ap-
proach to presumptions is the only one feasible for use in the
federal district courts. More than likely, the doctrine would escape
the rigors of Erie, but if not, it is clearly within the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court. The Thayer-Wigmore approach has
the added virtue of being simple and easy to administer by the
courts.90 Except for making sure that the "rational connection" test
is met for presumptions that will be used in criminal cases, the draft-
ing of the rules should be fairly easy. The rules adopted by the
Model Code should serve as a good starting point. Adoption of the
Thayer-Wigmore approach would add a strong element of uni-
formity in an area of evidence law badly in need of reform.91
a.h.g. jr.
80 The leading case is Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), where the Court
held that it was proper to require the defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity,
and that the defendant "is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all
the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing
crime." Id. at 484. The force of the evidence required to rebut the presumption of
sanity and make the issue of sanity a jury question which the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt is not very great. See, e.g., Amador Beltran v. United States, 802
F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962); Hall v. United States, 295 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1961); see also
Frank v. United States, 42 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1930) (burden of proving self defense);
Ezzard v. United States, 7 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1925) (presumption of guilt from posses-
sion). See generally 9 WIGMORE § 2501.
10 Moreover, a substantial number of courts have adopted the Thayer-Wigmore
approach. See generally Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. Rv.
824, 831 (1952); Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAv. L. Rlv. 481, 495
(1946); Morgan, supra note 87, at 259.
0 1 It is further submitted that the drafters of the various codified rules dealing with
presumptions have spent too much time debating brain twisting theories and not
enough time studying the broad spectrum of evidence reform. A very clumsy situa-
tion will be created if the states adopt the Uniform Rules approach and the federal
courts can only adopt the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine. Another example of the lack
of coordination is § 1-201 (81) of the Uniform Commercial Code which adopts the
Thayer-Wigmore doctrine for presumptions arising under that act. Thus, the National
Conference of Commissioners is advocating adoption of two sets of uniform laws, each
of which has a significantly different rule for the effect to be accorded a presumption.
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